





Environmental Policy and  
Capital Movements:  
The Role of Government 
Commitment 
Laura Marsiliani and Thomas I. Renström  
  













Laura Marsiliani, W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy,  
University of Rochester 
Thomas I. Renström, W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy,  







This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_wp.html 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  
 
Environmental Policy and Capital Movements:  








This paper explores the relationship between environmental protection and international 
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Policymakers often express concern that strict environmental protection will lead to capital
moving abroad with a consequent deterioration of international competitiveness, a rise in
unemployment and a slowdown of economic growth. This view has been reflected in the
recent political debate. For example, the European carbon/energy tax proposal of the early
1990s included the exemption of energy-intensive industries, in order to preserve their
international competitiveness. The proposal has not been implemented yet, one of the reason
being a likely loss in competitiveness of European countries. At the same time, the debate
concerning the implementation of the North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement (NAFTA)
focused at a large extent on the fear that US industries would relocate in Mexico, where the
environmental standards are more lax. Furthermore, environmentalists argue that governments
may have incentives to relax environmental policy in order to attract foreign capital and that
they may engage in a race to the bottom in environmental standards. This has also been
loudly claimed by some interest groups at the congress of the World Trade Organisation, held
in Seattle in September 1999.
Economists have analysed the effects of environmental policy either on the movements
of capital across regions or on the location behaviour of firms (see Jaffe et al., 1995, for a
useful survey, and Rauscher, 1997 and Wilson, 1996 for an overview).
1 The existing
theoretical studies typically find a positive correlation between stringency of environmental
policy and outflow of capital or industries. In particular, a study of capital flows and
environmental concern in a small open economy has been conducted by Bovenberg and van
der Ploeg (1994). They find that stronger preferences for the environment result in a reduction
in output and capital demand, which in turn causes capital flight.
2
1 In this paper we do not focus on decisions about firms’ or plants’ location but we focus on capital
movements, that is whether individuals invest assets at home or abroad. In this respect our paper is different from
the literature on strategic environmental policy and plant location. The two issues are however, often mentioned
together in the policy debate. For the role of government commitment on firms’ location decisions, see Ulph and
Valentini (2002).
2 A few theoretical papers, however, do not support a positive correlation between stringency of environmental
protection and capital flight. See, for example, Rauscher (1995) who claims that if a firm uses a clean
environment (rather than pollution) as a factor of production, strict environmental standards can reduce
production costs, enhance economic activity and attract foreign capital; and in a tax competition framework, with
redistributive concerns, Oates and Schawb (1988) and Wilson (1996). In this paper we want to point out another
reason, that is effect of government commitment.
1In contrast, the majority of the existing empirical studies, almost exclusively
concerning the US, find that environmental policy typically is not significant in explaining
capital movements and firms’ migration.
3
This reveals that standard theoretical models of environmental policy and capital
movements may fail to capture some important aspects of the problem at hand. For example,
the majority of the theoretical studies are set up in a static framework, whereas dynamic
considerations may play an important role. A relevant issue is at which date the environmental
policy is implemented with respect to the household’s decisions on consumption and
investment (which is not an issue in a static framework). In a dynamic set up, whether the
government can or cannot commit to the environmental policy will make a considerable
difference, due to the time-inconsistency problem.
4
Another feature of most of the existing studies is that only one policy instrument,
namely the environmental tax (or standard), is modelled. We think it is important to
incorporate a standard second-best framework, allowing for distortionary taxes as well (see
among others, Sandmo, 1975, and Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994). Furthermore, redistributive
concerns from rich to poor individuals may play an important role in the government’s
decision about environmental policy (see Oates and Schwab, 1988, and Marsiliani and
Renström, 2000a,b).
Moreover, observed policies are endogenous, and the decisions taken by majority
elected individuals. Only a few papers (see, for example, Marsiliani and Renström (2000a,b)
model environmental and fiscal policy endogenously, through voting. In a democratic system,
individuals have the possibility of voting on representatives. Whether the majority elected
candidate represents the preferences of the poor or rich part of the population, obviously
influences the policy choice. In fact, if the environment is a normal good, poorer individuals
demand less of it (see Marsiliani and Renström, 2000b).
3 For a survey of the existing empirical studies see Levinson (1996). An exception is List and Co (2000) who
find empirical evidence for the impact of environmental policy on firms’location behaviour.
4 A government’s policy is dynamically inconsistent when, although being optimal at the outset, it is not longer
optimal at a later date even if no new information has appeared. This means that the government has some
incentive to change its plans (see the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and for an application to
environmental policy, see Marsiliani and Renström, 2000a).
2In this paper, we want to examine the relationship between the degree of commitment
in policy, environmental protection, and capital movements. Our main interest is how a
different degree of commitment influences environmental protection and capital imports, when
both are endogenous. We take the view that governments adopt the optimal policy given the
constitution (i.e. given commitment or no commitment), and verifies under which
circumstances higher environmental taxes go hand in hand with capital outflow, when both
are endogenous. Furthermore, rather than focusing on a government’s incentive for changing
one policy instrument (such as environmental policy) we focus on the incentives related to
the entire tax system.
We develop a model that is rich enough for analysing this question. In doing so we
would need (at least) two periods (to capture intertemporal decisions), and we need a second-
best framework (to model distortionary taxation).
5 We introduce the second best by analysing
an economy with heterogeneous individuals, ruling out individual-specific lump-sum taxes.
Finally, policy is endogenised by letting individuals vote on representatives, and the majority-
elected representative implements her preferred policy. To capture the degree of capital flow,
we present an open economy where individuals own assets domestically and abroad; the
domestic assets are rented to firms. Consequently, capital outflow is given by the difference
between the stock of total assets and capital invested in domestic production.
Specifically, individuals differ in their learning abilities and this will make them spend
different amounts of time on learning, and thereby accumulate different amounts of human
capital, which in turn will give rise to wage differentials. Firms are perfectly competitive and
employ a CRS technology in physical capital, human capital and emissions. We will consider
a tax system consisting of a linear labour tax and an environmental tax (a tax on firms’
emissions that generates pollution externalities). The tax receipts are used for provision of a
lump-sum transfer. Individuals vote on candidates and the majority elected candidate
implements her preferred fiscal policy. Throughout the paper we refer to the second best when
a government can commit to future tax policy, and the third best when it cannot.
5 The time-inconsistency problem is a feature of second-best analysis (it never arises in the first-best). They
may arise either in one-person economies if lump-sum taxes are ruled out, or in many-person economies if
individual-specific lump-sum taxation is impossible. In both cases the problem arises if the elasticities of the tax
bases are dependent on when the policy decision is taken.
3We show that the commitment and the no-commitment equilibrium differ. The reason
is that a time-inconsistency problem in labour taxation arises. When the government can
commit to a level of the future labour tax, it takes into account that a higher level of the tax
causes individuals to switch from labour to study-time. If the government can reoptimise in
the future, the individuals have already invested in human capital and that stock is fixed. The
individuals only change their labour supply. The elasticity of the labour tax base is
(expectedly) smaller. Thus, labour is overtaxed in the third best (when the government takes
the tax decision after the individuals have chosen their investment in human capital), because
labour supply in efficiency units is less elastic.
Furthermore, we find that changing the constitution from discretion to commitment
makes the optimal environmental tax greater and at the same time reduces capital outflow.
Then commitment in tax policies results to be a factor which can explain a negative
correlation between environmental protection and capital outflow. The reason is that the
efficiency gain in moving to commitment increases the consumption possibilities of all goods,
and if the environment is a normal consumption good, the majority elected representative
tends to want to provide more of it, i.e. implementing a larger environmental tax. At the same
time capital outflow is less under commitment. The reason is that the labour tax is smaller,
and human capital investment larger. The larger supply of human capital increases the
productivity of physical capital and therefore tends to retain physical capital at home.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the economy is introduced and the
assumptions are formalised, and in Section 3 the economic equilibrium is solved. In Section
4 we characterise individuals’ preferences over policy, under the various timing assumptions.
In Section 5 we solve three politico-economic equilibria: the first when elections take place
in the second period and the majority elected individual implements policy in the second
period, the second when elections take place in the first period, but the majority elected
individual cannot commit to future taxation, and the third when elections take place in the
first period and the majority elected individual can commit. Several questions are of interest.
Does a stricter environmental policy go hand in hand with capital outflows, when
redistributive concerns play a role? And under which constitutions? What is the role of
inequality (in terms of learning ability and consequently income distribution) for the
implementation of a stringent environmental policy? And how does inequality relate to capital
movements? Section 6 concludes the paper.
42. THE ECONOMY
We shall specify an economy which is rich enough to analyse the relationship between
environmental policy and capital movements and that formalises the time-inconsistency
problem, but simple enough to keep the analysis tractable.
Individuals have preferences over period-one consumption, c0
i, period-one time spent
learning h
i, period-two labour supply, l
i, period-two consumption, c
i, and period-two provision
of clean environment, (-x), where x denotes pollution. Individuals are indexed by i and
characterised by their learning ability parameter γ
i, which is distributed according to the
distribution function Γ (i). The labour productivity of the individual in the second period is
her time spent learning in period one times her learning ability. Through most of the paper
we shall assume that the median (second-period) productivity is not greater than the mean.
6
Furthermore, we normalise the population size to unity.
In the first period individual i (with ability γ
i) receives a lump-sum endowment W0,
which is used for period-one consumption, and saving in assets a
i. In the second period, these
assets can be invested both domestically (i.e. rented as physical capital to domestic firms, with
R the rental price of capital) and abroad (foreign investments). The difference between total
assets and productive capital denotes capital outflow. In the second period, the individual
supplies labour, and earns the pre-tax wage rate w, per unit of efficient labour. The after-tax
wage income plus a lump-sum transfer from the government, T, and the returns on assets are
used for consumption. The price of consumption is normalised to unity. Pollution x is
generated by production, which takes place in period two. The government provides lump-sum
transfers by taxing labour income at rate τ
l, and pollution at rate τ
x. The after-tax wage is
denoted ω . In order to gain tractability, we assume specific functional forms. The next section
states these assumptions.
6 This implies an assumption on the distribution of learning abilities, Γ . See further section 3.
52.1. Assumptions
A1 Individuals’ preferences
The utility function is assumed to be of the form
(1a)




i ≥ 0, ε >1, and the parameters β , and η are strictly positive. Leisure has been
normalised to 1 and x denotes aggregate pollution. Ψ′ (x)>0, and Ψ′′ (x)≥ 0.
A2 Individuals’ constraints
The individuals’ budget constraints are
where ω≡ (1-τ




A large number of firms operate with a Cobb-Douglas technology in physical capital, labour
(in efficiency units) and pollution. Production yt, can therefore be calculated as if there was
a representative firm employing aggregate labour H, physical capital k and emissions x
(3) where (4)
A4 Government’s constraint
The tax receipts are fully used for lump-sum transfers
(5)
6A5 Representative democracy
The tax rates, τ t
l, τ t
x and, consequently, the spending decision are determined by a majority
elected representative, under either of three constitutions:
(a) elections are held in period 2, and the majority elected representative choose taxes
before the choice on period-2 labour supply and consumption is taken, and before the
allocation of assets at home and abroad are made;
(b) elections are held in period 1, and the majority elected representative choose taxes
in period 2, before the choice on period-2 labour supply and consumption is taken, and before
the allocation of assets at home and abroad are made;
(c) elections are held in period 1, and the majority elected representative choose taxes
before both period 1 and period 2 decisions are taken.
Case (a) is referred to as no commitment (third best);
Case (b) is referred to as partial commitment (third best);
Case (c) is referred to as full commitment (second best).
3. ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, the individual and aggregate economic behaviour are solved for given arbitrary
tax rates and public expenditure. We solve the model recursively, first the second period
equilibrium, then the first.
3.1. Second period individual economic behaviour
Maximisation of (1b) subject to (2b) gives the individuals’ labour supply
(6)
and indirect utility (up to an additive constant)
(7)
7We notice that the higher the after-tax salary is, the higher is the labour supply. Individuals
with more human capital (larger h
i) will supply more labour (everything else being equal).
A direct property of the preferences in (1) is that all income effect is removed from the labour
supply and carried over to consumption. An increase in lump-sum allowance therefore makes
the individual consume more, without changing the labour decision. In the second period, h
i
and a
i are constant and taken as given.
3.2. First period individual economic behaviour
Maximisation of (1a) subject to (2a) gives an individual’s choice of the level of h and a as
function of second period after-tax wage rate, ω , and second-period productivity,
We notice that there is a trade-off between time spent studying and investment in assets: a
(8)
(9)
higher rate of interest causes individuals to study less and to invest more in assets. We also
see that the higher the after-tax wage is, the longer is the time spent learning. Also, what will
matter for the individual’s attitude towards redistribution is not the ability to learn, but the




i(1+ε )/(ε -1). This is the key measure we will refer to in the rest of the paper.
3.3. Aggregate economic behaviour
The second- and first-period aggregate economic behaviour is generated by aggregating the
individuals’ quantities obtained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. To obtain the aggregate




8The difference between the second and first periods is that in the second period individuals
have invested in their human capital and assets and consequently h and a are fixed, while
viewed from the first period h and a are functions of the taxes. ˜ γ is the (1+ε )/(ε -1)
th moment
of the ability distribution, and is linearly related to the average work productivity. Whether
an individual earns a higher/lower wage rate (per hour) than average depends whether the
ratio γ
i(1+ε )/(ε -1)/˜ γ is greater/smaller than unity.
3.4. Firms’ behaviour
The firms’ optimality condition with respect to k (i.e. Fk=R) gives optimal k, and production,




In the next section, we shall examine policymakers’ preferences over fiscal policy.
4. PREFERENCES OVER POLICY
Any individual elected into office will choose policy to maximise her own utility, subject to
the government budget constraint. We therefore need to characterise how each type would
choose policy. Policy will then be a function of the type in office, and we can construct a
voting equilibrium (in section 5) where individuals vote over candidates.
First, it is more convenient optimising with respect to the after-tax wage, ω , and the
amount of the polluting factor, x, used, rather than with respect to the tax rates themselves.
In fact, in equations (6)-(11), (13)-(14) only ω and x appear. We only need to rewrite the
government’s budget constraint in terms of those quantities. Equation (5) can be written as
(17)
The timing matters only to the extent that H (aggregate efficient supply of human capital)
responds differently to changes in the after-tax wage, depending on when the tax decision is
taken. In fact, the first-order conditions will take the same form under the various assumptions




commitment) as well as policy, so the derivatives of l
i (and a
i, h
i if commitment) with
respect to policy can be ignored (by the Envelope condition). The problem of a hypothetical
candidate is to
subject to (17), (effects on l
i, a
i, and h
i can be ignored by the Envelope condition).
(18)
The first-order conditions to (18) are
These conditions have to be evaluated under the different assumptions of timing. First we
(19)
(20)
clarify how they differ.
(a) No commitment
An individual, if elected in the second period, will take the decision upon ω and x,
given the quantity of ˜ h. Optimal policy will be a function of the identity of the
candidate and ˜ h, which in turn is a function of ω
e (i.e. of expected ω ).
(b) Partial commitment
An individual, if elected in the first period, will take the decision upon ω and x, given
the quantity of ˜ h. However, the choice of ω and x have to be compatible with the
expectations of ω in ˜ h. This is so because individuals will observe who the elected
candidate is already in the first period and can form expectations of ω based on the
identity of the candidate. Optimal policy will be a function of the identity of the
candidate only.
(c) Full commitment
An individual, if elected in the first period, will take the decision upon ω and x,
recognising the influence on ˜ h.
10Since from the policymaker’s point of view ˜ h is given under both partial and no commitment,
partial commitment can be treated as no commitment for time being.
Aggregate labour in efficiency units as a function of policy can be written in one
equation, with the parameters reinterpreted under the various timing assumptions. Combining




Next, since all individuals have the same expectations (regardless timing) we can write
(24) where (25)
Differentiating (17) with respect to ω , using (21), and inserting the derivative into the first-
order condition (19) gives




Also, substituting (27) into (21) gives
(28)
(29)
11Since w=(1-α -µ) ˜ Ax
θ H
-θ , and 1-τ
l=ω /w, equation (27) gives (also using (15))
as the labour tax rate preferred by individual i.
(30)
Recall that ˆ γ
i is the ratio of individual i’s labour productivity to the average labour
productivity. If ˆ γ
i is smaller than unity the individual earns less wage per hour worked than
the average. Since ν takes on different values depending on the timing, the same individual
prefers a different tax rate under different timing assumptions. In fact, since ν is larger under
no commitment than under commitment, the labour tax is larger under no commitment than
under commitment. The reason is that the tax base H is less elastic under no commitment and
thus would be over taxed. We also see that, given the timing, an individual with greater
learning ability prefers to tax labour less.
We will now make a complete characterisation of the choice of a hypothetical individual in
office. This will involve substituting for ω H, as a function of the identity of the decision
maker and of x (equation (28)), into (19) and finding ∂ x/∂ ˆ γ
i. It turns out that ∂ x/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0 under
all timing assumptions (see the appendix). Since ∂ m
i/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0, then by (28) ∂ω /∂ ˆ γ
i >0 ,s ot h e
decisions are monotone in the decision maker’s learning ability.
Lemma 1 Assume A1-A5, and consider a hypothetical decision maker ˆ γ
*. The decision
maker’s choice will be functions of ˆ γ
* with the following properties






Proof: See the appendix.
We will now turn to the characterisation of the various politico-economic equilibria, and
examine the consequences of time inconsistency on environmental policy and capital
movements.
125. POLITICO-ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIA
Regarding voting we have a one-dimensional choice space (the identity of the decision
maker). We now need to examine the individuals’ preferences over candidates (potential
decision makers). If preferences over candidates are single peaked, then we know that the
candidate preferred by the median individual in the voting distribution cannot lose against any
other candidate in a binary election. Denote a hypothetical decision maker by superscript *.
Substitute the policy functions in Lemma 1 into individual i’s indirect utility, to obtain an
indirect utility in terms of ˆ γ
*. This indirect utility has the following properties
Lemma 2 Assume A1-A5, then individual i’s preferences over candidates’ ˆ γ
* are single
peaked, with the maximum attained
at ˆ γ
*=ˆ γ
i if no commitment,
at ˆ γ
*=(1+ε )/(2ε )+[ ( ε -1)/(2ε )]ˆ γ
i if partial commitment, and
at ˆ γ
*=ˆ γ
i if full commitment.
Proof: See the appendix.
Lemma 3 Assume A1-A5, then the economic equilibrium under partial commitment with
policymaker ˆ γ
* coincides with the economic equilibrium under full commitment with
policymaker ˆ γ
*′ = (1+ε )/(2ε )+[ ( ε -1)/(2ε )] ˆ γ
*.
Proof: Inserting ˆ γ
*′ in equation (30), and evaluating under no commitment (ν =ε ), gives the
same labour tax as when inserting ˆ γ
* in equation (30) and evaluating under full commitment
(ν =(ε -1)/2). If the labour tax is the same in both equilibria, then by equation (20), also the
pollution level x is the same in both equilibria. QED
Lemma 2 implies that we have a median-voter equilibrium, and that we can completely
characterise policy making given the underlying distribution of abilities. The single
peakedness follows from the monotonicity in the policy variables with respect to the ability
of the decision maker.
Lemma 2 also implies that when individuals vote in the first period, but the elected
policymaker implements policy in the second period, they will vote strategically on a
representative with a different (higher) ability than themselves.
13Proposition 1 Assume A1-A5, then in politico-economic equilibrium, the economic
equilibrium under partial commitment (voting in period 1, policy decision in period 2)
coincides with the economic equilibrium under full commitment (voting and policy decision
in period 1). The policymaker has a higher ability in the partial commitment than in the full
commitment equilibrium.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1, 2, 3. QED
Proposition 1 implies that due to strategic voting, the period-one elected representative will
implement the same policy in period 2, as a period-one elected representative would have
implemented in period 1. Thus the partial-commitment equilibrium will coincide with the full-
commitment equilibrium.
7 Since the partial commitment equilibrium coincides with the full
commitment equilibrium we will not distinguish between them two. We will henceforth only
refer to commitment versus no commitment.
Proposition 2 Assume A1-A5, then in politico-economic equilibrium the following holds
where ˆ γ






Proof: Follows from Lemma 1-2. QED
We notice that the wage tax decreases in the productivity of the decisive individual. This is
a standard result, and is caused by the fact that a less productive individual has more to gain
from redistributive taxation.
Furthermore, labour is overtaxed when no commitment is possible (i.e. in the third
best). This is because once the individuals have invested in their human capital, the elasticity
of labour supply in efficiency units with respect to taxes is less elastic (at that stage, it is too
late to spend more time learning). When commitment is possible, individual responses to
7 We do not expect this is a general property though, but is due to the assumptions regarding utilities and
technologies. Generally one should not expect all policy variables to exactly coincide. When policy is one-
dimensional, though, and the candidate space is rich (continuous), the full commitment and partial commitment
ought to coincide. This happens indeed in Persson and Tabellini (1994).
14changes in wages are greater. We see also from (30) that the greater the difference between
the median productivity and the average, the greater is the difference between the commitment
and the no commitment solution. Thus, inequality (in the form of skewness of the
distribution) makes the time-inconsistency problem more severe.
Finally, pollution in absolute terms is increasing in the productivity of the decisive
individual. This is so because this individual wishes to tax labour less, inducing individuals
to accumulate more human capital, which in turn makes pollution more productive.
Next, when we make all individuals identical we have the following result:
Corollary 1 Assume A1-A5. If all individuals are the same, the commitment and no
commitment equilibria coincide, and the environmental tax is at the Pigouvian level.
Proof: When all individuals are the same ˆ γ
*=1, and the labour tax is zero regardless of timing.
Equation (20) then gives the Pigou rule (which is the same regardless of timing).
QED
Thus, we verify that there is no time-inconsistency problem in the first best. This is a general
property, since the time-inconsistency problem is only a second-best phenomenon. In the first
best the wage tax is zero and any funding in addition to the environmental tax receipts is
obtained by lump-sum taxation, -T.
Furthermore, we get the following results
Proposition 3 Assume A1-A5, then total emissions, the after-tax wage, and production are
smaller under no commitment than under commitment. For given level of commitment, the
lower the ability of the decisive individual is, the lower are emissions, the after-tax wage, and
production.
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 4 Assume A1-A5, then the pollution tax is smaller and the ratio between
emissions and production is greater under no commitment than under commitment. For given
level of commitment, the lower the ability of the decisive individual is, the lower is the
pollution tax, and the higher is the ratio of emissions to production.
Proof: See the appendix.
15Intuitively, under commitment the consumption possibilities are greater; if the environment
is a normal good (which is ensured by additive separability in (1b)), the efficiency gains
achieved in the second best (in comparison to the third best) means more consumption of the
environment. This is achieved by taxing pollution more. Furthermore, if the labour tax is
small, investment in human capital is large and the marginal productivity of emissions is large
too. Consequently, it is optimal to increase emissions, but not to the extent that x/y increases.
We will next address the question of capital movements. Using the decision rules for
individuals’ savings as a function of the taxes we can state:
Proposition 5 Assume A1-A5. The politico-economic equilibrium under no commitment has
larger capital outflow than the politico-economic equilibrium under commitment. For given
level of commitment, the lower the ability of the decisive individual is, the larger is the
capital outflow.
Proof: Since the after-tax wage is greater under commitment (or under a policymaker with
higher ability), individuals invest less in physical assets (and more in human capital), by
equation (9). Since domestic firms’ capital demand is proportional to production (equation
(13)), and production is greater under commitment (or under a policymaker with higher
ability), domestic firms capital demand is greater under commitment. Thus, the difference
domestic savings - domestic capital use, is less under commitment (or under a policymaker
with higher ability). QED
Intuitively, commitment on the one hand increases the returns on human capital, which in turn
reduce domestic savings, and on the other hand increases the productivity of capital, overall
attracting foreign capital.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a general equilibrium model of environmental taxation and capital
movements. The most important feature of this model is that it examines the effects of
different constitutions, that is whether the government can or cannot commit to future tax
policy.
16We have shown that the commitment and the no-commitment equilibria do not
coincide, since a time-inconsistency problem in labour taxation is present. It arises when
individuals have the possibility of choosing the time they spend learning. They have to form
expectations about the labour tax the government is going to impose in the future. Once
individuals have invested in their human capital, the government is tempted to raise the labour
tax in order to redistribute from high earners to low earners. Individuals expecting this will
invest too little in human capital, and at the same time labour is overtaxed.
We have demonstrated that under commitment (second best), the labour tax is smaller
and the environmental tax is greater than under no commitment (third best). Intuitively, there
is a conflict between environmental and labour taxation and lump-sum transfers. If the labour
tax is small, the distortions caused by the tax system will be small as well. In this case, the
marginal utility of transfers is lower and the median voter will prefer to protect the
environment more (by paying a higher environmental tax). Furthermore, under commitment,
the increasing returns on human capital reduce domestic savings and increase the productivity
of capital, which in turns attracts foreign capital or discourages capital outflow.
Everything else being equal, societies with more commitment in fiscal policy would
have a tougher environmental policy and less capital outflow. Governments should avoid a
discretionary fiscal policy if they want to protect the environment and at the same time attract
foreign investment. Thus, this paper provides us with a theoretical explanation for why no
empirical evidence can generally be found of a positive relationship between the stringency
of environmental policy and capital migration.
In addition, our analysis has suggested that the non-committed tax differs more from
the committed one, the larger the difference in learning ability between the decisive individual
(median voter) and the average individual. This suggests that the time-inconsistency problem
becomes more severe when there is more inequality (in terms of mean-median distance). In
this case, a poorer decisive individual will prefer a higher labour tax and also have a greater
marginal utility of private consumption and lump-sum transfers, and therefore will be less
willing to protect the environment; at the same time capital productivity decreases and capital
migrates abroad. Viceversa, a more equal society, given the level of commitment, would have
tougher environmental policy and less capital outflow. Thus, through the inequality channel
we can also generates a negative correlation between environmental policy and capital
outflow.
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19APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
First ∂τ
l/∂ ˆ γ
i < 0 follows from equation (30). Next, we only need to prove that ∂ x/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0 under
all assumptions on timing. This is so since ∂ x/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0 implies, (by (29) in the full commitment
and no-commitment cases, and by (50) (below) in the partial commitment case), that ∂ω /∂ ˆ γ
i
> 0 (notice that by (28) ∂ m
i/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0). Taking the partial derivative of (17) w.r.t. x gives
which is the numerator in (20) (the second equality follows by (14)). Next, the denominator
(33)
in (20) may be written as follows (by using (6))
where the equality follows from (24). Then the first order condition (20) may be written as
(34)
(35) where (36)
We treat Z as a function of ˆ γ
i and x: Z(ˆ γ
i, x). Denote the derivatives by subscripts. We then
find the sought derivative by differentiating (35)
We now need to find the derivatives of Z. First we will rewrite (36). Premultiply (27) by H
(37)
and use (14), then we have the following
Next,
(38)
where the first equality follows by using (14) in (17), the second equality by using (38), and
(39)
the third equality by using (28). Using the last equality of (39) in (36) gives
(40)
20Sofar the analysis is valid under all assumptions on timing. We now need to proceed
differently, depending on which timing of events we assume. We begin with the no-
commitment case.
Under no commitment the last period’s learning and savings are taken as given, and
only the identity of the policy maker (as well as her choice) can vary. Here we have ν =ε (by
(23)), then Z
n, where superscript n denotes no commitment, (i.e. equation (40)) becomes
where the second equality follows by using (28), and the third by using (38). Use (21), (29),
(41)
and (38) to substitute for ˜ F, then we have




Substituting (43) and (44) in (37) gives ∂ x/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0 under no commitment.
(43)
(44)
Under partial commitment ω
e in ˜ h and σ changes as ˆ γ
i changes. When ˆ γ
i is known also
ω
e will be known (and coincides with ω ). This has to be taken into account in differentiating
Z. Under full commitment ω
e is under the control of the policymaker. The two cases can be
captured simultaneously. In both cases a
i will respond to changes in the identity of the
decision maker. Combining (8), (6) and (24), and substituting into (9) gives
No expectations on ω is needed because the decision maker will be known in advance.
(45)
8 N.B. under no commitment a
i is invariant with respect to policy, and varies only with respect to identity i.
The derivative (44) is negative since ∂ a
i/∂γ
i < 0, which follows from (9).
21Substituting (45) into (36) gives
where superscript c,p denote commitment, partial commitment, respectively. Substituting for
(46)
T according to the second equality in (39), and for ˜ F according to (38) gives
or rearranged
(47)
Full commitment implies ν =(ε -1)/2, then using (28) in (48) we obtain
(48)
where m
i/(ω H) has been substituted for by using (29).
(49)
Partial commitment implies that ω
e in (22) has to be replaced by ω . Setting ω
e=ω in
(22) and substituting into (29) gives (wherever ν appears it equals ε according to (23))
where σ 0 =˜ γ (Rη
2)
-1/(ε -1). Set ω
e=ω in (22) and substitute into (21), premultiply both sides by
(50)
ω , and substitute for ω on the right-hand side by using (50) to obtain (N.B. ν =ε )
In (48), using (28) to eliminate m




We are now ready to take the derivatives of (49) and (52), respectively.
(52)
22Differentiating Z
c (i.e. (49)) with respect to x and ˆ γ
i gives
(54) follows since Z
c is declining in m
i, and m
i is increasing in ˆ γ
i. Then (37) implies that
(53)
(54)
∂ x/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0 holds here as well.
Finally differentiating Z




where η =(ε -1)/2. Then (37) gives ∂ x/∂ ˆ γ
i > 0. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
Taking the derivative of individual i’s indirect utility function with respect to ˆ γ
* gives
(57)
The first term is the individual’s first-order variation with respect to ω times the change in
ω when ˆ γ
* changes. The second term is the first-order variation with respect to x times the
change in x when ˆ γ
* changes. With no commitment, and with full commitment, these first-
order variations are those that the individual would face if she was decisive. The peak is
reached at ˆ γ
i=ˆ γ
*.I fˆ γ
* < (>) ˆ γ
i the first-order variation is positive (negative) due to the
monotonicity in ω and x with respect to ˆ γ
*. With partial commitment, the first order variations
are not the same as the individual would face if being in office (because of the difference in
timing). However, by replacing with ˆ γ
*′ =(1+ε )/(2ε )+[ ( ε -1)/(2ε )]ˆ γ
i, the first-order variations
become the same, and the argument above applies. QED
23Proof of Propositions 3-4
In the no-commitment case, individuals will predict ω
e accurately. To characterise the
equilibrium, ω
e has to be substituted by ω in equation (22). This will result in equation (29),
with ν =(ε -1)/2 in the exponents, but with m
i evaluated at ν =ε (see equation (50)). Then, in
equation (29) the only difference between the no-commitment and the commitment equilibria
is that the former is evaluated at m
i
ν =ε , and the latter at m
i
ν =(ε -1)/2. Then, in comparing the
two equilibria we use equation (51) and perform comparative statics with respect to m
i. First,
by using (35),
since ∂ Z/∂ m
i < 0. Since m
i
ν =ε < m
i
ν =(ε -1)/2, m
i is greater under commitment, and consequently
(58)
x is greater under commitment.
Next, since the pollution tax is
we need to evaluate the ratio H/x.
(59)
First, using (29),
Next, use (58) to obtain (N.B. ν =(ε -1)/2)
(60)
Therefore, ∂ (H/x)/∂ m
i > 0, and H/x is greater under commitment, implying that τ
x is greater
(61)
under commitment. Finally since production is ˜ Ax
θ H
1-θ = ˜ Ax(H/x)
1-θ , the result on production
follows. The result on the after-tax wage follows from (29). The results regarding the identity
of the policymaker go through, since m
i is greater under a policymaker with higher ability.
QED
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